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 Lifeworld Inc. – And What to Do About It 
 
Introduction 
 
What if there was not one ontology we had to choose as constituting the 
world but several? Then, new ontologies, understood in the Humean 
sense as inferences about the world’s connections – ‘natural’ 
organizations/perceptions of experience  and of ‘causation’ and of what 
therefore constitutes both existence and non-existence (Norton and 
Taylor, 2009) - could come into being as constructed entities, not as 
timeless arrangements of perception that are always already there. We 
can understand this point in three ways.  
 
On a philosophical level, we might settle for a form of multi-naturalism, a 
term most commonly used by the anthropologist, Eduardo Viveiros de 
Castro, who argues, in a reversal of the usual mode of thinking, by way of 
an analogy with animist ways of thinking that conceive of entities as 
similar in terms of their spiritual features but as varying by virtue of the 
sort of body that they are endowed with, that though our culture is the 
same our natures differ (Latour, 2009). Following on from a critique of 
Kantian idealism, Viveiros de Castro argues that we need to multiply 
ontologies and ‘ontology-speak’. Such a conception is not as rare in the 
history of philosophy as might be thought. It was the vision of William 
James, for example. James argued that there existed a series of different 
non-isomorphic modes of existence
1
. Later in the twentieth century, we 
can point to the work of Etienne Souriau (1943, de Vitry Maubry, 1985), 
who proposed to tackle head on the question of the plurivocity of being 
not, as is so often the case in the history of philosophy, by offering up 
variations on one central mode of existence – that is knowledge - but by 
insisting that entirely different modes might exist. Feeding on the key 
notion that prepositions too are given in experience, as James would have 
had it, Souriau added flesh to James’s notion of a pluriverse by cleaving 
to the idea of a series of modes of existence. More recently again, 
Sloterdijk (2009) has made the argument for a right of return to a 
polytheistic ‘Egyptian’ world in which multiple spheres can live 
tolerantly side-by-side, rather than opting for a series of monotheistic 
cultures each of which can assert its sense of the world as the one and 
only. There is no world that is somehow more complete, in other words, 
but rather a series of incompletes. 
 
                                                 
1
 Such a vision can be taken as ontological in several ways. For example, it can be thought of as a form 
of polytheism understood as multiple sets of values, each of which imposes an obligation to live in a 
particular way. 
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A second way of thinking through the cause of multiple ontology comes 
from anthropology. From early in the history of the discipline, 
anthropologists have tried to peer inside other worlds which they have 
often thought of as not just cultures but as something much closer to an 
abiding sense of reality – what it is to be the case. In recent times, the 
most notable attempt at understanding this kind of worlding has been 
Descola’s (2005) fourfold classification of ontologies. But this 
classification has proved controversial. For example, Viveiros de Castro 
argues for the possibility of many more ontologies which either exist or 
are possible (see Latour, 2009). In a similar vein, others have argued that 
the radical mobility which animates so many cultures disables the very 
notion of a rooted and settled ontology; codes, structures and definitions 
are in constant change (e.g. Greenblatt, 2010). What is at issue is whether 
such a stance unsettles the very notion of ontology or simply adds another 
mode of existence to the roll call. 
 
On a third, more practical level, we might simply draw an analogy.  
When we think about the possibility of different ontologies, we might 
make a rough and ready comparison with the synchrotron, a cyclic 
particle accelerator which produces a beam of very intense light which 
can then be broken down into its constituent wavelengths, each beam line 
allowing different kinds of world/experiment/inference to be 
constructed
2
. Most synchrotrons do not use all of the possible beam lines; 
there are usually unused ports awaiting the construction of 
worlds/experiments/inferences yet to find a place in the scheme of things, 
new projections and stainings of the world, to use two Humean terms 
(Kail, 2007). I want to suggest that the world that I want to describe is 
just such a line in construction, a place in which a new 
world/experiment/inference is starting to be tuned up. 
 
The ontology that I want to describe as in construction depends on the 
birth of a new information age which is also, as in previous information 
ages (see Headrick, 2000), a transformation, most particularly in the 
production of space, brought about through new practices of organizing, 
analyzing, displaying, storing and communicating information. In a 
                                                 
2 Such as, in the life sciences: protein and large molecule crystallography, and drug discovery and 
research. In materials science: ‘burning’ computer chip designs into metal wafers, studying molecule 
shapes and protein crystals, analysing chemicals to determine their composition, inorganic material 
crystallography and microanalysis, fluorescence studies, and semiconductor material analysis and other 
structural studies. More generally: geological material analysis, medical imaging, and proton therapy to 
treat some forms of cancer.  
 
 3 
number of other works (eg Thrift, 2005), I have described the way that 
the proliferation of Euclidean calculation has produced a new kind of 
world not once but twice. In each case, what started as an epistemological 
shift transmutes into an ontological one. In the first pass, the Euclidean 
model of numbered and angled space produced a grid over the world. 
That process took some four hundred years to complete, if we date it as 
beginning with the first large-scale surveys and as carrying on through 
the advent of chronometers in the early nineteenth century to end with the 
advent of global positioning systems based on satellites (Higgins, 2008). 
The second pass overlapped in that it began with the introduction of new 
forms of information technology that produced a generalised capacity to 
track movement and is likely to end with a redefinition of the world of 
persons and objects as constituent elements of a mutually constitutive 
moving ‘frame’ which is not really a frame at all but more of a fabric that 
is constantly being spun over and over again as position becomes mobile, 
sometimes producing new patterns.  
 
The effects of this second pass are still in formation but already we can 
see that they are producing a world of ‘movement-space’, at least in those 
places where the technology stretches
3
. This is a space in which 
movement is able to take on a different form, no longer understood as a 
simple displacement in space, knowable only in terms of the actual, the 
movement already taken, but arising instead from the institution of what 
Manning (2009, p187) calls a ‘resonant grid’ that can itself shift shape 
and which is able to detect and work with the coming-into-existence as 
well as that-which-already-exists, a world of moving ‘through movement 
moving’ (Manning, 2009, p64)4. This paper is both about what that form 
is and what possibilities it might call forth.  
 
If I had to summarize the developments I want to describe, I would draw 
on the work of Tim Ingold. Ingold is an exceptionally interesting but, in 
the end, traditional phenomenologist. His work on lines (Ingold, 2007) 
argues that we are beset by a world in which Euclidean lines which work 
from point to point have superseded an older and better way of 
proceeding which might be understood as the wayfaring line, the kind of 
line which can wander about (and which, by inference, is closer to the 
fabric of the world). I want to argue that the kind of world in which this 
wandering, wayfaring line held sway is now being rebuilt – but out of 
                                                 
3
 It is important to note that these developments are not confined to the former Euro-American core but 
stretch in to many other spaces, for example, China. 
4
 Manning (2009) works up a convincing portrait of a radically empirical world but ignores the way in 
which this portrait could become the anchor for new kinds of power, perhaps because she believes that 
intensity is anathema to quantification. 
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fields of number, out of the stuff of calculable coordinates. In this process 
of reconditioning the world, a new ontology is being constructed which, 
as Stiegler (2009, p) argues, takes us on from the ‘orthographic age’; 
‘technical development [gives birth to] a new programmatic; this new 
programmatic is a process of psychic and collective individuation’ but, as 
I shall argue, it is much more than this process of individuation
5
. It is a 
more far-reaching reconditioning which is allowing a new kind of 
landscape to be built out of different gradients of resistance which 
reconstitute what we think of as the world.  
 
The paper is therefore organized as follows. In the main section of the 
paper, I argue that the ontological horizons of human societies are 
changing as a result of a series of developments which allow what I will 
call, after Sterling (2009), the security-entertainment complex to come 
into being, a complex made up of two particular linked assemblages 
which have gained increasing purchase by feeding off each other. The 
security-entertainment complex has replaced the military-industrial 
complex as the main creator of an exaggerated humanity. It produces a 
stance towards the world which is naturally experimental and which is 
able, to use a Humean phrase, to employ technology to make this 
experimental stance, ‘irresistible’. This ‘irresistible’ experimental stance 
aspires to be all-encompassing but it must perforce retain an open-
endedness if it is to be effective
6
 and this open-endedness provides all 
manner of opportunities to experiment in ways which allow for its 
interrogation and recomposition.   
 
In the subsequent section of the paper, I will argue that, if my previous 
arguments are accepted, then we need to think seriously about social 
science methodology. For in this kind of restless experimental world, we 
may not need data as such – that will be there in increasing abundance – 
so much as new means of probing what is going on and instigating new 
behaviours/asssemblages. We need, in other words, to invent an art of 
experiment which can up the methodological ante. I am looking, then, for 
a social science which promotes a rewoven empirics which, most 
particularly, generates the quality of provocative awareness. That means 
an experimentalist orientation must be in-built which can start and restart 
association. I will consider three moments in the invention of this art of 
experiment. 
 
There are some very brief conclusions which return to the theme of 
ontology. 
                                                 
 
6
 Thus retaining both of dimensions of the meaning of experiment (see Krohn and Weyer, 1994). 
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The Experimental Economy 
 
In other papers (Thrift, 2008, 2009), I have tried to point to ways in 
which our sensing of the world is changing so that the conventional 
technology of writing is no longer enough, both because the new 
technologies have conjured up a technological unconscious in which 
writing is only one, and not necessarily the primary means of description, 
and because new kinds of ‘writing’ are coming into existence which 
‘explicitate’ in different ways, thus allowing other forms of description to 
take on life. In other words, there is what Stiegler (2009, p35) calls a 
‘general modification of event-ization’ based upon the back and forth of 
moving fields of data which are able to track and trace human 
‘motivations’ by reworking them in much richer ways than were possible 
in the era of writing. This diagrammatic world
7
 has a long and tortuous 
genealogy which has gradually placed human being in a ‘blur of only 
partially registered data constantly shaping the world by means of 
correlations guided by error corrections’ (Bender and Marrinan, 2010, 
p200). 
 
But for the world to show up as this kind of descriptive regime, one 
which sacrifices perceptual certainty for the alternative rigours of a 
continual experiment in experiment, demands the reconstruction of our 
inferences about the how the world is connected. Such a generative 
phenomenality depends upon the construction of the world as a surface in 
continuous motion, a world which depends on being able to construct a 
constant state of provisionality, a world always almost there, and thus 
always elastic in the way it leans into the moment, a world of infinite 
mobilization.  
 
Such an auto-activated world arises out of five main socio-technical 
characteristics which have come into existence over the last thirty years 
or so, and which, when taken together, point to a reconstruction of the 
technological unconscious. The first of these characteristics is a 
structured continuity which always privileges the appearance of 
movement. As Galloway (2004) points out, what is actually being 
privileged is one form of structure – the horizontal network – over 
another – the tree. This surface is not narrative-based or time-based. 
Rather, it is a form of continuity which gains its phenomenal grip from 
ensuring that what should be an experience of dislocation is experienced 
as an intuitive plane of motion – always going somewhere - through a 
                                                 
7
 This world is consistent with the move made in continental philosophy towards philosophical drawing 
or ‘thinking in diagrams’ in which the diagram becomes a moving outline (Mullarkey, 2006). 
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whole host of techniques which are designed to sink into the background 
and to be background: conceal innards, eliminate dead links, make sure 
there are no dead ends, inject the meaning of the link into its forms, place 
all content as close to the front door as possible, disallow any 
differentiation between media types like text, images or animation, work 
at the highest speed possible, eliminate all traces of where the medium 
derived from, multiply feedback loops (email responses, chat rooms, 
blogs, etc.) so that many-to-many communication is easy, and so on.  
 
The second characteristic is the nature of the interface used. In the 
manner of all nascent technologies, computer interfaces have been 
modelled on previous technologies – keyboards and the semi-ubiquitous 
screen, in particular (Nusselder, 2009). But this has been a first phase 
only: interfaces are now changing their character. The symptomatic 
change is often regarded as the spread of touchscreens, as are becoming 
increasingly common. But these devices can be seen as, at best, half-way 
houses. The work of Maes and the Fluid Interfaces Group at MIT is a 
good guide to the evolution of thinking in this area and to what the future 
holds as motion control becomes a reality
8
. Maes started out by designing 
horizontal screens which resembled landscapes, enlivened by touch 
technology. But now she is working on devices that will continuously 
augment the physical world with digital information by using gesture as 
the main interface. Thus she is designing a system called SixthSense 
which has at least some understanding of where the user is, what the user 
is doing and who the user is interacting with. A small camera sees what 
the user sees and reacts with relevant information. It also tracks the 
movements of the user’s hands. In turn, when the information is 
recovered a small projector in the same pack as the camera will project it 
onto any suitable surface, so that any surface can become an interactive 
surface. 
 
The third characteristic is ‘awhereness’ (Thrift, 2008):  the continuity of 
motion becomes locative as the world is tagged with an informational 
overlay. It would be foolish to suggest that we are yet at the stage where 
the dreams of pervasive computing have become a reality
9
 - the dreams of 
‘everyware’ (Greenfield, 2006) dictating everywhere (Economist, 2010) - 
but it is certainly possible to see an emerging ambition: to tag a locational 
identifier to any unit of content so that it becomes possible to say that 
                                                 
8
 Indeed, Microsoft has been working on a roughly similar system, Project Natal, which will allow 
people to play video games without a hand controller (Kendall and Ahmed, 2010). 
9
 Though everyday means of visualization of location are now becoming available, such as 
gowalla.com and foursquare.com, as are free maps, symbolized by Nokia’s and the British Ordnance 
Survey’s recent announcements. 
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‘maps ma[k]e more sense than spreadsheets’ (Sterling, 2009, p113). 
Everywhere will be coded. That is the ambition. In turn, that ambition 
will produce a phenomenological inventory and a means of navigating it 
whose heterogeneity will both reflect and mould our opportunistic, 
flexible patterns of attention. 
 
To use Mackenzie’s (2009) phraseology in another context, maps have 
always been engines rather than cameras. But now, even more than 
before, maps become key means of achieving social assent (Wood and 
Fels, 2008) - as the unit of account, as the means of defining the defining 
features of the world, as the means by which it is read descriptively and 
prescriptively at the same time
10
. But these are now inhabitable maps in 
which location is engineered in order to produce defined experiences 
which can be commoditized and validated as commodities by their 
thereness. It is too strong a statement to say that the population ‘no longer 
[draws] distinctions between immersive games and the city streets’ 
11
(Sterling, 2009, p129) but the population does increasingly function as a 
set of human pantographs, measuring out the world and themselves both 
at once (Wood and Fels, 2008). Indeed, we might see the inhabitable map 
as a new version of the imperial map but one in which the maps are not 
just means of colonization but the colonization itself. The inhabitable 
map produces both a knowing, empowered imperial audience and its 
subjects
12
. Thus a summary of the wherewithal of the imperial map has 
layers of irony when applied to the present day: 
 
All maps serve thoroughly ideological functions in that they allow 
their users and readers to engage either instrumentally or 
intellectually with the world. They might do so at a variety of 
conceptual scales or degrees of resolution, depending on the 
cartographic mode within which they are produced, circulated, and 
consumed, but all maps empower their users and readers to 
discipline the world and to construct territory. The mapping by one 
polity, within its own spatial discourses, of the territory of another 
establishes a geography of the mind, within which empire can be 
conceptualized and advocated, and a geography of power, within 
                                                 
10
 I take it that maps include a full complement of paratexts or, as Wood and Fels (2008) would have it, 
paramaps, all the surrounds and extensions of a map which are crucial to its survival as a relatively 
immutable entity (see Thrift, 2004). 
11
 The phrase ‘augmented reality’ has been expressive of a pipedream up until now but as iPhone apps 
like NearestTube become ubiquitous, as other applications like Google Goggles become common, and 
as social network applications like Brightkite (which allows users to find friends in their vicinity by 
turning on the camera on their mobile phone and pointing it around them) spread, so the world can be 
literally overlaid. 
12
 ‘Google Earth is at once a delightful and marvellous way to travel around the world vicariously and a 
somewhat scary reminder that we can be and are being watched’ (Akerman, 2009, p2). 
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which empire can be physically be constructed. ‘Empire’ is a 
cartographic construction; modern cartography is the construction 
of modern imperialism (Edney, 2009, p45).  
 
But, in the contemporary era, maps take on a different quantity, 
measuring out territory that is continually on the move, thus rendering the 
imperial impulse a more flexible entity in which territory can be 
temporarily held – on a permanent basis. 
 
The fourth characteristic is constant feedback. Advances in facial 
recognition and the detection of honest signals make it increasingly easy 
to read bodily responses – from the face or more general body movement 
- in real time. The result is that an old ambition, dating back to the ancient 
Greek, Physionymas, to be able to read the signs of a person’s nature, to 
read a person’s temperament and inclinations from external appearance, 
is able to begin to be realized en masse as the imperceptible becomes 
capable of being measured. A new doctrine of bodily signs can come into 
being which makes its way into official certifications of who we are 
embedded in software which literally re-cognizes us. This is 
fingerprinting taken to a new level. But it is more than this. For a 
redefinition of the body is also taking place, an automation which itself 
produces more signs of the body, but an extended body. Studies of 
human-computer interaction have concentrated on replicating and 
extending what Harper (2009) has called the physical geography of 
bodily interactions, whether that be how we move, touch, or glance, on 
more complex, communicating bodies. In setting out on this path, new 
forms of the body and mindfulness are being produced via technologies 
which have concentrated on amplifying just a few means of bodily 
extension as surrogates for communication. Thus the human zoo is being 
populated by new variants which have been produced through 
concentrating on intensively ‘breeding’ just a few physiological traits.  
 
At the same time, another form of feedback has spread: it becomes 
possible to produce ‘interactive composition’, a term first used in the 
1970s in new music to refer to instruments that made decisions that 
responded to a performer (Lewis, 2007), so introducing the idea of shared 
control of the music-making process in which simple pre-arranged 
processes are replaced by innovation as a result of inserting the ability to 
improvise. In turn, this notion has led to all manner of improvisatory 
technologies which allow the user at least some say, active co-
construction, if you like, through ‘live algorithms’. As software has 
become more interactive, so its effects have become more pronounced. 
Not only does feedback allow the producer and consumer to interact and 
 9 
co-construct worlds, thus commodifying all manner of enthusiasms, but it 
also allows new forms of intelligibility to come into being, based upon 
negotiation. 
 
The point is that this fourth development is not just about media, but 
about social media, which can be understood as a new form of mediology 
in which the details of the everyday lives of millions of people are able to 
be uploaded and analysed: ‘what was ephemeral, transient, unmappable, 
and invisible [becomes] permanent, mappable, and viewable’ (Manovich, 
2009, p324) and thereby acts as a new source of entertainment located 
somewhere between factual content, opinion and conversation
13
. Often 
painted as a playground of individual choice, this new sphere is actually 
heavily biased to the interests of corporate producers, following the 
templates of the professional entertainment industry. Thus, companies 
‘have developed strategies that mimic people’s tactics of bricolage, 
reassembly, and remix’. In particular, industry is able to capture the 
tactics pursued by individuals as a conscious part of corporate strategy by 
producing products that are explicitly designed to be customized (Beer 
and Burrows, 2010). Thus ‘strategies and tactics are now often closely 
linked in an interactive relationship, and often their features are reversed’ 
(Manovich, 2009, p324, p323), as people’s tactics are turned into 
strategies and sold back to them.  
 
The fifth characteristic is that cognition becomes even more of a joint 
experience between persons and things. Of course, this has always been 
the case but what is different now is that, as well as inevitably being 
incorporated into matters of concern, things have a say themselves as 
more than dumb actors as agency is displaced on to a host of new and 
varied entities. It is as if writing itself starts to write. Agency increasingly 
presides in disembodied entities, in presences, ‘agents without’, to use 
Chodat’s (2009) term. It is like an illustration of Whitehead’s world view, 
in which all things have a degree of consciousness, but one that is boosted 
as more and more things are able to become able. Thus, we return to a 
kind of animism in which the body is the same but natures differ. The 
world starts to resemble that of the Shinto religion in which spirits (Kami) 
occupy objects and galvanize them.  
 
How might we understand this world of new forms of verification and 
extimacy as it gradually gains both some measure of stability and some 
                                                 
13
 Thus, increasingly research shows that people are getting news content through their social networks, 
with all the consequences that has for the conduct of public opinion. Content, news or other media are 
used to initiate a conversation, in other words (Manovich, 2009). Lippmann’s phantom publics become 
regnant. 
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stability of measure? One possibility is to argue that what we have arrived 
at is a society characterised by a generalised theatricality. This has 
become a common move in the literature (eg Virno, 2005, Ranciere 2009 
Schulze, 2007). But what is often overlooked is that                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
theatre is itself a technology and one that has changed through its history, 
often in reaction to ideas about the capacities of space of the spectator 
which are themselves politically charged. Given that history, it might be 
better to argue that theatricality and play are being reformatted to fit an 
era in which the conventional theatrical frame becomes only one of many 
options for sensing the world.  
 
I want to argue that what is happening is something different: the driver 
of these five intertwined characteristics is better described, in contrast to 
the previous era of the military-industrial complex, as the result of a 
society in thrall to a security-entertainment complex, an era of permanent 
and pervasive war and permanent and pervasive entertainment, both 
sharing the linked values of paranoiac vigilance (Truby, 2008) and the 
correct identification of the potential of each moment
14
. The first sector, 
boosted by the replacement of the binary of war and peace by a 
generalised state of conflict, now takes in a vast array of activities from 
prisons and myriad private security forces
15
 and new forms of predictive 
policing to the multiple kinds of surveillance that populate everyday life, 
which rely on vast material infrastructures
16
. Increasingly, after events 
like 9/11 and the generalised response to the war on terrorism and drugs 
around the world, defence has been recast as a part of this sector rather 
than vice versa (Turse, 2008). Equally, the entertainment sector has 
grown in size and influence, becoming a pervasive element of the world. 
From the base of consumer electronics, through the constant innovations 
in the spatial customization of pleasure found in mass leisure industries 
like toys or pornography, through branding, gaming and other spatial 
practices, to the intricate design of experience spaces, entertainment has 
become a quotidian element of life, found in all of its interstices amongst 
all age groups. And these two sectors are becoming co-extensive - from 
the obvious fact that corporations are now often involved in both sectors 
(Turse, 2008)
17
 to the general emphasis on surveillance by police or 
military or retail corporation, from the spreading of consumer electronics 
                                                 
14
 Thus, the interest is, as I have pointed out elsewhere, in the identification of propensity, a theme 
which can be argued as arising from classical Chinese military strategy or, indeed, a kind of 
Whiteheadian aesthetics in which the cure for malaise is replaced by attention to the unexpected. 
15
 Of which a company like Blackwater is simply the most visible part. 
16
 Many of these developments are based on military models which have been generalised up so that 
they become something else. It is worth remembering that militaries are predominantly bureaucracies. 
17
 Thus, in a particularly striking juxtaposition, the TV series Law and Order is a product of the defence 
giant, General Electric. 
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research and development costs across both markets to the common 
availability of graphics cards which can be used for all manner of 
simulations, as well as the general use of applications from iPhones by 
both consumers and the military (Economist, 2009)
18
. 
 
These two sectors have more or less involvement with the state, though in 
all cases that involvement is extensive, but they also involve growing 
levels of corporate activity which often complement, simulate or simply 
substitute for state functions. Indeed, it would be possible to argue that 
they lie at the heart of an authoritarian capitalism that has been 
remorselessly building over the last twenty or thirty years, a post-
democratic consensus in which business and state elites rule the roost 
through, precisely, a mixture of control through surveillance and 
distraction through entertainment, thus allowing capitalism free rein: ‘the 
forms of democracy remain fully in place [but] politics and government 
are slipping back into the control of privileged elites in the manner 
characteristic of pre-democratic times’ (Crouch, 2004, p6). The result is a 
kind of convergence of state forms based on the premise that it is no 
longer clear that capitalism and democracy are necessary partners in a 
world where it is possible to have both the ‘inverted totalitarianism’ 
(Wolin, 2009) of the United States and the machinations of a state like 
China. In both constituencies, as in many more, politics increasingly 
becomes the pursuit of profit through a citizenry which ‘welcome change 
and private pleasures while accepting political passivity’ (Wolin, 2009, 
pxv) in what has become an increasingly managed political process based 
around the self-conscious constructions of a media system which has 
become much more than an overlay and in which the values and practices 
of politics and celebrity have become increasingly synonymous (Dill, 
2009)
19
. The promise of happiness reigns (Ahmed, 2010, Ehrenreich, 
2009) and liberty drains away (Kampfner, 2009, Wilson, 2009). 
 
Whatever the exact relationship with the state in its formal or outsourced 
mode of operation, both the security and entertainment sectors of the 
economy have been able to grow substantially and become more and 
more closely integrated through the growth of two linked capacities, both 
based on the greater interactivity that has become possible as socio-
                                                 
18
 As in the availability of both an app like ‘chirp’, which allows consumers to identify birdsongs, and 
an app like ‘bullet flight’, which allows consumers who want to be snipers to calculate range and 
trajectory (and which, incidentally, has been adopted by the American forces) on the same platform. 
19
 Indeed, Bill Clinton can be seen as the forerunner of this kind of world, with his voracious appetite 
for data coupled with immense affective skills. 
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technical convergence has occurred
20
. The first of these capacities is the 
growing intelligence of intelligence. Founded on the ubiquity of ‘active’ 
data, the intelligence-gathering principles and outcomes of both the 
security and the entertainment industries have become remarkably similar 
in their aims, based on models that can track activity through a pervasive 
sphere of information which no longer cuts space up but suffuses it. 
Means of information targeting (and I do not think that the descriptor is a 
coincidence), whether by means of contextual targeting, demographic 
targeting or now behavioural targeting are used by both realms, and often 
draw on the same principles, research, and software. Not surprisingly, 
some of the firms doing the work are held in common
21
. Then, both 
sectors increasingly construct the world as the output of the mediology of 
a set of modulated online social networks whose purpose is to build 
exceptional nodes which are able to gather network power to them. But 
‘to be a node is not solely a causal affair’ it is not to ‘do’ this or to ‘do’ 
that. To be a node is to exist inseparably from a set of possibilities and 
parameters – to function within a topology of control’ (Galloway and 
Thacker, 2007, p40). These networks depend on distributed means of 
aggregation/individuation  that allow a continual process of variation to 
occur, thus not only producing data but also providing the push whereby 
that data can keep on coming into existence. They thus provide the 
opportunity for new kinds of power to grow up based on exceptional 
topologies rather than sovereignty as such and founded in protocols of 
resonance.  
 
The second capacity is the engineering of stress. Events nowadays come 
freighted with stress, not least because of the increasing cultural 
organization of extreme emotions that, at one time, would have chiefly 
been in the grip of religion. Both the security and entertainment 
complexes have taken to engineering these emotions by mixing better 
calculation with better understandings of emotional aggregations, whether 
these be the self-intoxication of terrorist networks or the pursuit of erotic 
and other allied forms of capital by celebrity fans (Payne, 2009, Hakim, 
2010). The world becomes akin to a permanent and calculated state of 
‘entertainment’, what Muhlmann (2008) calls ‘evaluated 
uninhibitedness’, pulled into shape by various panic and anti-panic 
architectures (Truby, 2008).  
 
                                                 
20
 An interactivity best signalled by the massive success of the game, Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 2 
in 2009 which became the first true interactive Hollywood blockbuster, a bigger launch hit than any 
film had ever been (Nuttall, 2009). 
21
 Indeed, one could argue that, increasingly, surveillance has itself become an entertainment 
opportunity, as in the spread of ‘reality television’ of various kinds, crime shows featuring surveillance 
tapes, etc. 
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In such a state of ‘en(ter)trainment’, Tarde’s principles of glory, whether 
of a military or celebrity nature, take on a renewed significance since 
display is so important. In the modern world, as Tarde (2007) pointed out, 
there are not only divisions of labour and divisions of riches but also 
divisions of glory. This glory can take many forms, including military 
exploits, intellectual prowess, and, most importantly, celebrity. But what 
has become clear is that though few can share in the spoils of a division 
of glory like celebrity, many other ways of attaining this kind of status 
have become available to the population on a smaller scale as a result of 
the rise of structured social networks which have allowed all kinds of 
‘long-tail’ communities to agglomerate, each with their own systems of 
merit which, because of information technology, can be metered and 
accordingly prized. The proliferation of these gloriometers, to use a 
Tardean term, is itself a part of how the modern division of glory is 
constructed (Thrift, 2008).  
 
What we can see, therefore, is a decisive change that has taken place in 
Western cultures as older ideas and practices of decorum, based on a 
notion of abstinence, have gradually been replaced by newer cultural 
frames which emphasize quite different ways of making sense of the 
world - ways founded on calculated excitation and especially on being 
able to generate what Collins (2008) calls ‘forward panic’ (with reference 
to a battlefield where instead of panic setting off a flight to the rear, it 
produces a ‘flight to the front’), the result of an overpowering emotional 
rhythm in which a prolonged period of tension is followed by a period of 
quick-release; ‘a dramatic shape of increasing tension, striving toward a 
climax’ (Collins, 2008, p85). These frames, which have depended on the 
spread of mass entertainment, and the corresponding appetite for affect in 
a screened world, tend to value emotionally intense action over reaction 
and include melodrama, which I have outlined elsewhere (Thrift, 2007), 
and what Muhlmann (1996) calls ‘suspense-dramaturgy’, in which the 
tension generated by the fear of death which at one time was reserved for 
war, becomes general. The constant calculation of situational tension 
becomes general. The models of attaining glory have shifted too. For 
example, threat and reward can be distributed on the principle of glory 
found in activities like gaming
22
. Notions like gaming become 
widespread because they formalise and make visible tournaments of 
emotional value which then enshrine these tournaments as brief but 
attractive nodes. This is a mutation in the means of social control which 
draws on continuous recording of the emotional investments of the 
population for fuel – and for power. It is a new infrastructure of feeling, 
                                                 
22
 I think it is no accident that so much of the modern world relies on gaming, including the military. In 
a sense, war and entertainment can become synonymous (see Gregory, 2008). 
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one which acts rather like the electricity grid or roads in its ability to both 
transport and energise the economy. 
 
The political increasingly becomes captive to this constituency, in which 
feeling and the abstraction of calculation are threaded together
23
. The 
conduct of such an ‘ontological’ politics is based on engineering attention 
of a kind that has been pointed out many times now, but no longer 
brought about through a ‘simple’ theatricality. Rather, what counts as 
theatre is being radically redefined by the knowledges of a coalition of 
agents, ranging from games designers to the purveyors of grand stadium 
shows which function in the round. Theatre is no longer a single framed 
space in which determinate genres are acted out at set times (Thrift, 
2008). Rather, it consists of what, following Deleuze and Guattari (1987, 
pp174-175), we might call the deterritorialized (that is, taken out of its 
humanized role) facialization of the world
24
 in which the intent is to 
gradually produce an experience of immersion which both limits (through 
the selective engagement of attention) and expands what can be sensed 
and how it can be sensed through a careful attention to movement through 
space (Kozel, 2007), allowing knots of infiltration and dispersion of 
affect to be tied and untied constantly, to be temporarily arrested and then 
let go again. It is an immersive mode of complete absorption in a 
particular iteration
25
 which, rather like Chantal Akerman’s pellucid films 
or site-specific events like the 2009 walk-through show ‘It Felt Like a 
Kiss’, with its increasingly common conceit of using an old, abandoned 
building as a tool to combine theatre, film and music in new ways, can be 
both physical and virtual, both documentary and fiction, both distanced 
and deeply felt, both movie and installation, all at the same time (Sultan, 
2009). It is ‘like a shifting, complex flipbook’ (Sultan, 2009, p53) in 
which novel juxtapositions induce novel senses of the singular (not 
particular), immanent to themselves but always also the rem(a)inder of 
another reality (Read, 2008).  
 
                                                 
23
 As attested to by the way in which Ronald Reagan and, subsequently, a whole series of American 
Presidents have become political totems. 
24
 Agreeing with Levinas’s account of the face as something that cannot be reduced to a face (see 
Diehm, 2003) and that the whole body needs to be facialized – ‘not only the mouth but also the breast, 
hand, the entire body, even the tool, are ‘facialized’’ – they then, in effect, undermine Levinas by 
generalizing the face, making it something more problematic
24, an indistinct ‘crossing and re-crossing 
of intensities across and between … surfaces’ (Read, 2008, p37). Facialization does not stop at the 
limits of the body. It includes the whole environment, the landscape. What Deleuze and Guattari (1987, 
p181) call the faciality machine ‘performs the facialization of the entire body and all its surroundings 
and objects, and the landscapification of all worlds and milieus’.  
25
 As a number of commentators have pointed out, immersive has become a kind of watchword across 
many spheres (cf Bracken and Skalski, 2010). Its most extreme manifestation is currently to be found 
in the new generation of 3D films, which in the latest technological format seem likely to stick as more 
than a novelty, as well as the rise of augmented reality applications.. 
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The growth of these two capacities for what is often called in the 
videogame industry natural mapping might be understood as the first 
stirrings of a phenomenology machine, one which has been rebuilt from 
the ground up to be able to reproduce phenomenal awareness through an 
orrery of surfaces understood as flows brought about by an economy 
which organizes ‘the system of energetic exchanges … within an 
ecosystem with the system of sociocultural devices which make it 
possible to reproduce these flows’ (Descola,2002)26, a phenomenal 
awareness made to appear whole through the art-science of appearance, 
thus echoing phenomenology’s prehistory as a theory of appearances 
(Henry, 200). This is Lifeworld, Inc. It relies on a whole battery of 
explicitated knowledges of the semiconscious glance which give the 
impression that ‘those particular images were already in my head, and I 
was looking for them’ (Akerman cited in Sultan, 2009, p16, see also 
Thrift, 2008). In other words, each glance, ‘taking in so much in so little 
time’ (Casey, 2009, p203) requires the careful construction of a 
compelling sense of always being already there, of the promise of a kind 
of almost unity
27
. It is an instrumental phenomenology, if you like, in 
which the supposed authenticity of the lifeworld becomes a market value 
that can be constructed through the calculated marriage of apperception 
and feeling, moment by moment (Pine and Gilmore, 2007, Kamvar and 
Harris, 2009)
28
. Such construction of temporary envelopments – open-
ends which are constructed for determinate ends - does not require clear 
and distinct images so much as it requires the construction of a mental 
state through a blur of motion which awakens the imagination of the 
observer, providing both continuity of experience and affective release; 
‘an image which releases strong emotions is not visible in the normal 
sense of the word as is the case with pictures that can be looked at and 
recognised in peace’ (Muhlmann, 1996, p66)29. These mental states are 
therefore full of ‘ingenious gaps’ resulting from careful techniques of 
omission or compression. In other words, they depend not so much on 
stimulating latent qualities and capacities (though this can occur) as on 
building mental landscapes which are able to confirm their own 
existence, not so much by negotiating new rules as by founding series 
upon series of momentary new worlds which continually sweep up the 
gleanings of perception because they feel ‘full’ (Viveiros de Castro, 
                                                 
26
 I am well aware that Descola is writing about the case of the Achua socialization of nature but it is 
interesting to think how contemporary developments may be pulling us in this direction. 
27
 We might see this as a modern version of Freud’s ‘after-education’, a revived awareness of 
something that feels like it is already known, but instrumentalized and made portable. 
28
 But, as Manning (2009) and Canales (2009) point out, each step in producing new machines which 
can track this blur allow other possibilities to be realized which, in turn, allow the construction of new 
machines. 
29
 Muhlmann (1996) argues that this is an organic disposition resulting from the quick paths affect 
takes in the brain. Perhaps. 
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2004). These worlds ‘do not represent movement: they live it’ (Manning, 
2009, p108). 
 
This landscaping complex can survive and become imprinted on the 
population as new inferences about the world because, correlatively and 
in part because of the developments I have described, and the permanent 
display behaviours (Muhlmann, 2008) that they generate, processes of 
psychic and collective individuation are changing
30
. Subjectivity has been 
turned inside out. In contrast to the idea of the romantic subject with a 
deep inner core we now find subjects being built which rely on the 
onflow of information in motion to comprehend their place in the world. 
There is a growing space for a kind of mobility of identity. In particular, 
the exterior of the body becomes a richer and richer place to inhabit as all 
manner of signs, itemizations, glossaries, and taxonomies come into 
being, dependent on bodies that can be honed and even changed in ways 
that were previously unavailable and which provide numerous means of 
accumulating glory through means of self-description that are also means 
of self-transformation
31
. In other words, the subject is built up and gains 
its identity from the imperfect stitching together of new means of 
identification and naming, mediated by the security-entertainment 
complex. Rather like the change that took place between the Middle Ages 
and the Renaissance, when lists, and identifiers like origin, height, and 
distinguishing marks both increased in and changed in nature, becoming 
more systematic, thereby producing a subject used to being described by 
and thinking through all manner of such characteristics (Groebner, 2007), 
so what we now see is new means of contact and surveillance arising 
which do the same. Subjects are enmeshed in a web of markings which 
define their existence, which brand them as them: search engines, social 
networking sites, web pages, video clips, ringtones and mixes, and maps 
combine to produce new forms of identity paper which act as passports to 
particular kinds of experience, replacing the seals, letters of introduction 
and conduct, registers and lists and certificates, travel documents, and 
other means of recording proof of authenticity and assurance that once 
defined a person’s existence. These older forms of proof may still exist, 
embedded in software, but they have become simply the first step in 
                                                 
30
 The footprint of the security-entertainment complex is nowhere clearer than in the educational 
sector. Teaching instruction has become an odd mixture of show-and-tell. Current pedagogy prepares 
the child for a world in which they will need to be able to present publicly, seek out data, and produce 
new kinds of significance about what it means to be a subject. They need to be not so much learners of 
determinate knowledge as little entrepreneurs of onflow. 
 
31
 Of course, this is not to suggest that the fallout from this obsession is necessarily a good one: It 
produces a new distribution of losers (see Berlant, 2008). 
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constructing a personal profile
32
. In turn, that profile can be worked upon, 
feeding back into mass personalised entertainment, as in the growth of 
YouTube, through sharing, buying, managing, recording and 
downloading. Again, security and entertainment intermesh
33
.  
 
The Empirical Turn 
 
Something interesting is happening in social science which is, I believe, 
connected to the developments I describe. It is born out of a sense of just 
how simultaneously embedded and lost human beings are in the newly 
transparent world of the security/entertainment complex in which, 
through the agency of state security and a knowing capitalism, both 
wanting to know ever more, quantitative and qualitative data have 
become more and more voluminous with the consequence that an 
increasing part of the output of what was formerly carried out by social 
researchers – surveys, questionnaires, interviews, and the like - is now 
available as data in one form or another. Much of what was regarded as 
the domain of social science therefore no longer needs to be explicitly 
constructed but is a part of the processes by which the world is made
34
. In 
other words, the very ubiquity of data and the corresponding ability to 
mine them for all kinds of associations that they were not originally 
intended to contain produces an interesting challenge for social science.  
 
One ‘not good enough’ response to the challenge is to argue that these are 
not the right data and all kinds of other data are still needed. Another ‘we 
can do things better’ response is to argue that social science can provide 
better and better tools for analysing these data. A third ‘we know best’ 
response is to argue that only social scientists have the theories to make 
meaningful sense of these data. All these responses may have their own 
resonance but it is worth noting that there are voices amongst the agents 
of knowing capitalism who argue that in time these kinds of objections 
                                                 
32
 Another way to see this is as a change in the technology of address (see Thrift, 2007). 
 
33
 It is also worth noting that just as the change in processes of subjectification between the Middle 
Ages and the Renaissance involved building up new spaces, changing the nature of distance by 
building up a dense infrastructure of mobility that could work at a distance to produce the justification 
of identity - ‘whoever sought to enforce judicial literacy had to conquer space. Registers and lists thus 
became mobile’ (Groebner, 2007, p74) – so the changes taking place now are redolent of that period in 
that they also play with how distance is constructed and understood in order to produce new means of 
justification. 
 
34
 Of course, there is still a need for construction of some data but only rarely of a wholesale kind, as 
in the past.  
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will become moot. The sheer weight of data will outweigh them: the 
redundancy of information will render them meaningless.  
 
Certainly, in the face of such developments, there is an argument that 
social science now needs to rework what it is doing. Recent interventions 
have argued as much (eg Adkins and Lury, 2009). This is not to say that 
mass data-gathering exercises will no longer be needed. But they will 
become just a part of a much larger activity of continuous data collection. 
What is certainly not possible is to simply call a halt to these 
developments. Equally, it is not possible to just let them lie, a stance 
which can take two forms. One is to fall back on a kind of empirical 
theoreticism, in which speculative insights from continental philosophy
35
 
are taken to be the case which the world illustrates, insights which are 
only lightly tethered to any empirical stratum but act as though they were 
already empirically validated. The other, which is just as problematic, 
argues that we should simply conduct business as usual and that recent 
developments might even be a good thing, allowing us to return to the 
good old craft of social science.  
 
But that still leaves several alternative responses that are possible, 
ranging from the fundamental work of redefining what is meant by basic 
social science terms like ‘the case’ (Berlant, 2008) through the forging of 
a ‘faster’ mode of proceeding which documents new developments as 
they unfold, using an amalgamation of journalistic and social science 
methods (Thrift, 2005), and on through to the growth of an interest in 
‘social science fiction’, the conjuring up of dramatized analyses of social 
structures and situations, of which ‘The Wire’ (and its attendant garland 
of academic interpretations) is often regarded as the archetype. 
 
Given the constraints of space, I want to single out what is only one of 
these many alternatives. That is the notion of social scientists as involved 
in promoting the experience of an extended childhood, and the 
corresponding virtues of ‘growing young’ that mirror the neotenous 
character of the human species. After all, human beings are (un)naturally 
experimental. Their purpose is to continually search out the contours of a 
world they can never fully fit into. They are permanent orphans but they 
are orphans precisely through their attachments (Montagu, 1981, 
Evernden, 1993). 
 
In other words, rather than constitute social science as a theatre of 
certainty I want to produce something more open-ended; ‘a theatre for 
                                                 
35
 Such as the sometimes penetrating and sometimes simply whimsical certainties of a Badiou or a 
Zizek. 
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events and operations with sometimes necessary but never sufficient 
reasons’ (Stengers. 1996, p257). As humans grow old, many of them tend 
to lose the qualities we often associate with being child-like, a capacity 
for imaginative play, curiosity and the eagerness to learn, and an 
associated receptiveness to new ideas, and a general willingness to 
experiment. This new empirical turn is born out of a desire to recapture 
some of these qualities in a social science grown middle-aged. It 
privileges what might be called the experimental, a ‘showciology’ if you 
like
36. ‘Experimental’ can sound as though social science is simply aping 
scientific protocols but, as this brief preface makes clear, I want to argue 
that it signifies something quite different, something which can be 
eloquent and even brave and which contains the germ of real possibility, 
not least because it allows the world to speak back into the all-
encompassing ambitions of the security-entertainment complex in 
unexpected ways from which it is possible to learn new associative open-
ends. This is production without guarantees, based on a programme of 
‘borrowing’ space in an explicit return to a kind of nomadism which no 
longer privileges fixed territory as necessary to produce effects but which 
does not therefore think that the attachments of territory are somehow 
unimportant
37
. 
 
I want to begin by calling up a phrase first used by Gaver, Boucher, 
Pennington and Walker (2004) – cultural probes – to frame this ambition. 
For Gaver, Boucher, Pennington and Walker (2007, p1) cultural probes 
were ‘collections of evocative tasks meant to elicit inspirational responses 
from people’. Even though the frames could be controlled in these tasks, 
the outcome was uncertain - and indeed was meant to be uncertain - 
because definite knowledge has its limits, and needs to be supplemented 
by other modes of understanding that value uncertainty and exploration. 
The aim is precisely to produce frames that can produce uncertain 
outcomes, to be able to incorporate surprise. This is what Gaver (2002) 
calls the construction of a ‘provocative awareness’ which takes what is 
often thought of as an artistic impulse
38
 – to imagine new things – and 
harnesses it to the practices and protocols of social science so as to be 
able to be prepared for and able to take in the vagaries of a fleeting but 
                                                 
36
 I take the term from Read (2008) but use it in a very different way. One could equally relate this term 
to Latour’s ‘slowciology’, an attempt to highlight the fact that sociology must involve chains of 
intermediaries so that, for example, there is no instant leap possible between local and global. 
37
 In making this performative turn, I do not want to shy away from the undoubted difficulties. Most 
particularly, performance tends to format things and so is in constant danger of missing the 
unformatted things, the not yet formatted that Latour places under the general heading of ‘plasma’. But 
performance does at least have the merit of stressing latent potential which gets part of the way there 
(Read, 2008). 
38
 Though clearly it is not, since one might just as well argue that science owns this impulse too.  
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decidedly nonsuperficial glimpse/glance as a key means of orientation. 
As Casey, (2007, p91) puts it, this is; 
 
neither glancing intently at – which presumes that the object is 
already targeted and that I wish to bear down on it – nor is it just 
glancing around: a much more casual and open act. The glancing in 
which I need to engage involves a keen searching out of my 
environs, given that I am greedy for geographical guidance. Such a 
glance is not a move of last resort – when all else has failed – but a 
step of first resource … It takes account of, indeed it is a direct 
response to, my lack of previous knowledge – not a mere reaction 
to it, but a move that copes creatively with my unoriented state. 
I say ‘unoriented, not ‘disoriented’. The distinction is not trivial in 
the present context. To be disoriented is to be genuinely lost in the 
landscape … To be unoriented is to not know where I am – not yet. 
This does not mean that I am lost: it just means that I cannot 
specify my whereabouts … 
 
The intent, then, is to produce different kinds of familiarity which 
demand neither conviction nor rejection but rather the taking up of the 
latent potentiality in a situation. Such dispositions are not about what to 
do or who to be but about suggestion, curiosity and wondering. The work 
of the social scientist, then, is to produce cultural probes that can help 
people to rework the world by suggesting new unorientations rather than 
correctives.  
 
Now, I think there is an element of the romantic (and a dash of 
humanism) in this kind of formulation but, at the same time, it does 
suggest a different means of travelling - towards a mode of investigation 
which can create the medium of its own existence. At the same time, I 
think that the notion of cultural probe needs expansion: specifically 
cultural probes need to be understood as spaces, frames constructed to 
produce uncertain outcomes which still have grip, frames which both 
interrupt and restart the process of association and, in the process, conjure 
up invitations to act differently. And where has most work been carried 
out on the kinds of spaces which keep connection in play, which provide 
people with speculative tasks and stimulate provocative awareness, which 
are most likely to trigger not just what might be laid out for them but 
something else entirely? I would argue that it is best found in the make-
shift, hugger-mugger field of performance, a field where 
characteristically there is no separation between inscription and site: ‘a 
sequence of spheres in a multiplicity of movements’ (Read, 2008, p37). 
The point is to design and animate spaces so that they can function as 
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edifices which can concentrate and work on processes of association – 
spaces which are able to transmit differential traits. Such spaces, 
functioning at a slant, would produce knowledge by boosting 
involvement in ‘something that remains to be done’, through ‘new and 
renewed associations’ (Read, 2008, p45). Now, one thing to say straight 
away about an art-science of giving rise to new developments, of 
producing infection, is that the lore of these spaces has often only been 
partly written down: the effects of different spatial arrangements of 
bodies and objects, of different props, of different assumptions about how 
space is figured, of what is different about a network of scaffolding, or a 
cage, or a cul-de-sac, or a door, or a bridge may be obvious in everyday 
life but they exist as a fragmented series of knots of knowledge across 
different disciplines and practices which only intermittently communicate 
with each other. So we not only need knowledges of space but integrating 
knowledges of these knowledges in order to take part in acts of restarting 
the social. And these knowledges need to allow us to practice an 
intensified reflection, a surreflexion as Merleau-Ponty put it, a reflection 
on reflection which opens with in its own fabric an abyss which it cannot 
span but can only worry at (Toadvine, 2009). I will point to three of these 
models of what Mullarkey (2006) calls ‘ecstatic naturalism’, each of 
which counts as an opportunity to mobilize ‘the often unrecognized, 
vague and fuzzy spaces in between forms of reality, knowledge and 
practice’ (Brown and Stenner, 2009, p39) which ‘work because they do 
not work’ (Serres, 1980/1982, p13). 
 
One – the most obvious - is the reworking of phenomenology itself. It is 
worth remembering that phenomenology is concerned with alterations in 
the sense of being in the world and, consequently, changes in the sense of 
what is significant and therefore possible – and possible to change. But 
only a few commentators continue to insist that phenomenology is 
irreversibly caught up with the anthropological machine and therefore has 
to embrace the conscious subject as the bellwether of these changes or it 
is nought
39
. I have already argued that the security-entertainment complex 
creates a kind of instant phenomenology of what is available in the world, 
a bricolage born out of an inhuman set of associations which depend as 
much on what is omitted as on content. But this is a very different 
phenomenology from that which has gone before. Not only is it dynamic 
and designed but it gives objects much more importance than traditional 
phenomenology since it is so obviously an assemblage that depends upon 
the articulation of bodies and objects in new combinations for its force – 
and the parallel provision of room to describe them as the expressive play 
                                                 
39
 Either in order to defend its traditional incarnation or as a means of stabilizing it so as to make it a 
polar opposite and therefore a convenient object of critique (eg Latour). 
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of differences. In other words, this is a phenomenology which can take 
both continuous change and the exteriorization of human being into 
account through technics whilst simultaneously subverting 
phenomenology’s idealization of material form. That way, we can start to 
overcome some of the objections to traditional phenomenology and also 
understand that such a phenomenology will look very different from the 
phenomenology to which we have become accustomed. We can think of a 
number of comparatively recent attempts to do this. One is the later work 
of Maurice Merleau-Ponty on nature and chiasmic becoming in which 
reflexivity is no longer ‘a power of the human subject or the auto-
affection of a tacit cogito, but is rather a manifestation of being’s own 
self-interrogation’ (Toadvine, 2009, p18). In particular, his account of 
space moves from one in which all orientation derives from the being of 
the human subject to a pre-experiential space which is formed at the 
confluence of body and world which is simultaneously being’s own 
orientation, its striving towards expression. The second attempt is to be 
found in the work of writers like Don Ihde (2008, 2009) which attempt to 
reconstruct phenomenology by adding technics – human-technology 
interrelationships – into the brew, thereby underlining not just that it is 
impossible to predict technological outcomes but that the spaces of 
human-technology interrelationships continually mutate. The third 
attempt is the work of Peter Sloterdijk on spheres which depends on the 
evolution of technologies of surrounding in which new atmospheres can 
be explicitated, constantly bringing new worlds into being. Space 
becomes a set of envelopes, containing different atmospheres and acting 
as a postal system which both allows and constrains their intermixture.  
 
These new takes on phenomenology have been instantiated in various 
practical ways but, in the end, they have usually depended upon 
producing new, more expansive forms of localization (Lippard, 1997). 
Most of the examples of this localization come from the arts, from 
performance, from installation art, from site-specific art, and so on (see 
Bishop, 2005). They depend upon devising responsive processes that are 
able to be instantiated through the design of places that produce 
experiences of immersion which, in turn, produce new associations and 
project them outward.  
 
More recently, artists and performers have been experimenting with how 
to produce ambulatory places, places that are able to be linked up into 
sometimes planned and sometimes meandering chains of action which 
can straddle the globe, usually using a combination of physical props and 
information technology. It is neither possible nor necessary to summarize 
this work – it is too diverse. But it has a questing spirit which is surely 
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vital. Perhaps the most interesting development – precisely because it is 
so embedded in the socio-technical developments I have been describing 
– is the move to so-called radical game design. These games can involve 
redesigning apparently standardised spaces like houses, or the 
manipulation of spatial devices like maps or board games, or the 
production of actual locative games which blend online and urban spaces, 
or even the construction of games which explore geopolitical 
consequences in ways which are not just interventions but openings to 
other worlds in which new forms of emancipation and attachment can 
thrive (Flanagan, 2009). In each case, they are concerned to redefine 
situations so as to produce different kinds of players. 
The second knowledge might be termed a biopolitics of space. This area 
takes in a number of endeavours, including those in geography, 
biosemiotics and bioart (c.f. Dixon, 2009, da Costa and Phillip, 2008). but 
developments in architecture are amongst the most interesting. As Till 
(2009) argues, architects are the perfect denizens of the security-
entertainment complex in that they design prisons – entertaining prisons 
but prisons nonetheless. A number of architects have tried to exit this 
conditioning, often by moving to a paradigm based on flow. This kind of 
work has become popular of late because it seems to offer a means of 
producing organic evolution of built form or what is usually called, after 
Lynn (1999), animate form: ‘the evolution of a form and its shaping 
forces; it suggests animalism, animism, growth, actualisation, vitality, 
and virtuality’. The process of animating form involves animating the 
form of a design so that it is not only conceived of as in motion but 
allows the motion to alter the force of form.  
But I want to factor into this growing body of work the lessons we might 
learn from the parallel turn in architecture towards evolutionary motifs 
and especially the energy unleashed by the idea of animal (or perhaps I 
should say post-animal) urbanism (Ingraham, 2007). This kind of work 
has been stimulated by many sources – not least the increasing fund of 
research which shows that animals modify their environments in ways 
that resist reduction to simply instinct and stress genuine cognitive 
processing (Gould and Gould, 2007, Hansell, 2007). Certainly, many 
architectural forms – particular mouldings of space - have proceeded by 
analogy or at least association with the animal in its many forms. But, as 
Ingraham (2007) points out, this is an enterprise fraught with difficulties. 
Hence Ingraham’s deployment of the category of post-animal in order to 
try to avoid certain standard patterns of argumentation. What Ingraham is 
trying to envisage is an architecture in which spaces would associate in 
new ways such that no Chinese Wall exists between nature and culture. 
She is then able to consider all the ways that living beings produce the 
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specific complexities of space in order to animate an unknown reserve of 
floating forms. This architecture is a kind of mapping of what Ingraham 
(2007, p319) calls ‘life problems’, ‘the deeper reaches of aliveness that 
are simultaneously biological, territorial, engaged in critiques of the 
various ‘fields’ in which life exists, a play between constancy and 
motion, materiality and information, and so forth’, and is intended, 
therefore, to also act as a challenge to the assumptions that are already 
embedded in the cybernetic and biological metaphors that inform the 
software with which architecture now defines it’s world. Such 
architectural projects can be thought of, in other words, as arguments 
taking shape. In many cases, architects responding to the call to animate 
have simply designed more sophisticated prisons but, in a few cases at 
least, they have produced ‘out of place’ entities which genuinely provoke 
thought, just as out of place animals can (see some of the studies in 
Vidler, 2008). 
The third knowledge is writing. We might put this another way. Can we 
write the world differently? Take the transduction of sound into script. 
‘To record the sound sequences of speech’ writes Friedrich Kittler, 
’literature has to arrest them in a system of twenty-six letters, thereby 
categorically excluding all noise sequences’40. But what about the ghostly 
imprint of an imaginary, supplemental alphabet starting with letter 
twenty-seven (Galloway and Thacker, 2007, p159)?
41
 We might argue 
that it is precisely the attempt to find and illuminate this extra letter (and 
many more too) in what Krauss (2010) calls the ‘post-medium condition’ 
that is what the experimental turn is trying to achieve, not by ignoring the 
standard letters of the alphabet but by adding new ones in which allow 
other descriptions of the world to become possible, thus producing new 
forms of script and of its accompanying illumination.  
 
Script and medium both have to be simultaneously re-invented because 
writing now works across many sensory registers, in a period when data 
flow has become such a gargantuan prospect that explicitating it through 
various means of visualisation has become a task in itself, one which 
demands substantial aesthetic/cursive skills (see Klanten et al, 2009, 
McCandless, 2009 and websites like flowingdata.com). In each sensory 
register, the act of explicitation (Sloterdijk, 2007) is a choice of 
emphasizing some features over others in order to produce a coherent 
script. Certain ‘notations’ banish or subsume other features. Others 
                                                 
40
 I hardly need to remind the reader that many alphabets around the world have more than 26 letters 
but the idea is clear. 
41
 In the nineteenth century, in many countries, the 27
th
 letter of the alphabet was the ampersand (&). 
Perhaps this symbol could stand for the project of association I am trying to unfold here. 
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underline them. Others still, in synaesthetic vein, substitute the features of 
one register for another. These are new means of animating the world. 
Neither words nor images but both of these and more besides: procedures 
that can frame the world in new ways which deliver a kind of structured 
uncertainty from which it is possible to detect new things, and, at one and 
the same time, the ways of writing these things down which themselves 
are likely to constitute a defective but productive orthography, one in 
which errors of transcription occur and synaesthetic overflow is common, 
and can themselves become ammunition for ‘landscapization’ (Deleuze 
and Guattari, ). 
 
Perhaps these new forms of writing are best characterized by the 
extraordinary renaissance of mapping, using the kind of spatial 
knowledge that is the leitmotif of the security-entertainment complex but 
bent to different ends. Maps have become the elemental currency of the 
security-entertainment complex, the basic unit of account – a means of 
building infrastructure, locating and wielding influence, shaping identity 
and generally explicitating new territories that are then there for the 
taking. But they can be used in other ways too which make them into 
means of questioning the world rather than just asserting it: tactical 
cartography in a world of map or be mapped (Kitchin and Dodge, 2007). 
For example Goodchild (2009, p575) talks of the growth of ‘citizen-
sensors’ who volunteer information for general use, as in the 
OpenStreetMap mapping of Atlanta or the proliferation of mapping 
parties and mapathons. All kinds of other agencies for redrawing our 
spatial vernacular are opening up too from GPS drawing to wikimapia. 
The net result is becoming clear, at least. Whereas in the past, we; 
 
relied on the authority of agencies and systems to provide our 
geographic information. [We] set up structures, such as boards of 
geographic names, to approve the names people assign to features. 
And [we] changed the names of features when we found the 
existing names, the vernacular names to be unacceptable for some 
reason. 
All of that, suddenly, has changed … we are, in effect, back to the 
days of the 1500s when it was possible for someone – a 
cartographer – but with no qualifications whatsoever, and no 
authority, to produce a map which led, in effect to the naming of 
America. 
 
Not only is it possible to use maps as a means of giving people their own 
means of visualising their position - through people’s GIS, various forms 
of mash-up, and so on – but they can also be used as means of reworking 
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the familiar so as to make it unfamiliar, not just renaming but reworlding 
all kinds of spaces, from borders to landfills, from trade to landforms (see 
Abrams and Hall, 2003, Cartwright, Gartner and Lehn, 2009, Harmon, 
2003, 2009, Kozloff, 2008, Mogel and Bhagat, 2008, Thompson, 2009). 
We are asked to ‘rethink the map, the landmark we presumed we could 
locate, the direction we thought we knew how to follow’ (Manning, 2009, 
p183) in order to alter our capacity to connect and relate. As just one 
example out of many, Gaver (2002, 2006) recounts the derivation of a 
series of technological devices which allow people not just to reframe the 
world but to use it more imaginatively, devices which produce maps that 
have play incorporated into them. In a way, what we can see typified here 
is the opportunity for people to re-define/re-cognize their environments, 
not so much by enveloping them (as in the Sloterdijkian account
42
) as by 
producing new gaps, fractures, breaks and slippages, thereby inventing 
new, more mobile definitions of historical memory, mindfulness and 
political engagement that provide at least the opportunity to connect 
differently.  
 
Conclusions 
 
In a famous passage, Viveiros de Castro (1998, p92) argued that the 
Western tradition of thinking had an impoverished notion of ontology, in 
contradistinction to the proliferation of epistemology talk.  
 
The Cartesian rupture with medieval scholastics produced a radical 
simplification of our ontology, by positing only two principles or 
substances: unextended thought and extended matter. Such 
simplification is still with us. Modernity started with it: with the 
massive conversion of ontological into epistemological questions – 
that is, questions of representation – a conversion prompted by the 
fact that every mode of being not assimilable to obdurate ‘matter’ 
had to be swallowed by ‘thought’. The simplification of ontology 
accordingly led to an enormous complication of epistemology. 
After objects or things were pacified, retreating to an exterior, 
silent and uniform world of ‘Nature’, subjects began to proliferate 
and chatter endlessly: transcendental Egos, legislative 
Understandings, philosophies of language, theories of mind, social 
representations, logic of the signifier, webs of signification, 
discursive practices, politics of knowledge – you name it. 
 
                                                 
42
 Sloterdijk’s atmospheric trope breaks down when pushed too far, or leads to an intensification of his 
theoretical model to the point where the alternatives become hard to see. 
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But, as I have tried to show, this lack of an ontological vocabulary is now 
becoming a practical as well as a theoretical issue. A new ontology is 
multiplying, which is able to survive by virtue of technologies which 
seem to lead to irresistible inferences about the world, because they, quite 
literally, put things in their place. For, at the heart of inference is the 
ability to weave space and time into a fabric which acts as an automatic 
default: each ladder and snake seems to follow on from each other, as 
though no other solution was available. What is happening currently with 
Lifeworld Inc is that practical vocabularies for understanding and 
constituting this ontology are running ahead of any theoretical 
vocabulary. That might not matter if these vocabularies were a benign 
development but many of them are not. They are caught up with new 
expressions of power, the aim of which is to reterritorialize the world 
through the deployment of resources which, rather like the apple in the 
fairy tale, have the ability to poison how we live. Lifeworld Inc needs to 
be reworked so that its excesses can be halted and its undoubted treasures 
can be brought to the fore.  
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